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The 1951 Refugee Convention and the UNHCR had a longer pre-history drawing
on experiences influencing its further developments. A critical predecessor in this
regard was the UN’s International Refugee Organization (IRO), established in 1946
to deal with Europe’s displaced. While mainly focusing on Europe, the IRO was also
active in Africa and Asia, but it only cared for European refugees there, while non-
Europeans were excluded from its mandate. This text takes a closer look into this
overseen history and the lasting effects of this discrepancy.
The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention is widely known and criticized as Eurocentric
(see Krause, Mayblin, White). Its drafters and initial signatories had Europe’s
remaining World War II refugees in mind and established the UNHCR to deal with
them (UNHCR’s original mandate ran until the end of 1953). In its beginning, non-
European refugees were not a concern of the Convention or the UNHCR. Gradually
expanding its activities beyond Europe throughout the 1950s and 1960s, only with
the 1967 Protocol did the UNHCR get a legal basis with global reach.
However, it is less known that some refugees in Africa and Asia did indeed come
under the Convention’s refugee definition in 1951. These refugees were Europeans
who had earlier escaped from Europe to safer places outside the continent. They
did not fall under the general refugee definition of the famous second paragraph of
Article 1A but under its lesser-known first paragraph, covering refugees protected by
earlier international arrangements. Zooming in on this overlooked paragraph offers
an avenue into the pre-history of the 1951 convention. It furthermore shows that
the Eurocentrism of the post-war refugee regime was not a geographical limitation
to the continent. Instead, it was an origin-based Eurocentrism limited to European
refugees, no matter where they had found refuge in the world. Or to put it bluntly: In
1951, refugees could fall under the Convention’s mandate anywhere in the world –
as long as they had come from Europe.
Let us first dive into the legal and institutional pre-history of the Convention before
we conclude with the example of some Polish refugees in India and Africa and what
this has to do with India’s non-ratification of the Convention until today.
Article 1A, Paragraph 1 or, the importance of the IRO for the Geneva
Convention
Seen from today, the year 1951 might seem to be the starting point of the
international refugee regime, but the Convention and the UNHCR did not start from
scratch. Both had essential predecessors, shaping its policies, practice, institutions,
and the Convention’s text. According to the first paragraph of the Convention’s
refugee definition, a refugee is someone who
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(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and
10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of
the International Refugee Organization
The first two Arrangements were concluded under the League of Nations’ High
Commissioner Fridtjof Nansen and covered stateless Armenian and Russian
refugees. Mentioned 1933 Convention expanded this group only slightly but
introduced the concept of “nonrefoulement” into international law for the first time.
The last two dates refer to conventions covering refugees from Nazi Germany
(1938) and annexed Austria (1939). However, we want to focus on the last part
here: The International Refugee Organization (IRO; 1946-52). The IRO was the
United Nations’ first specialized agency and the UNHCR’s most important direct
predecessor. The IRO developed the “durable solutions,” introduced the sharp
distinction between “refugee” and “migrant,” and IRO officials were instrumental in
drafting the Convention. The IRO set the scene for the international refugee regime
we know today, so it is worthwhile to take a closer look at this short-lived institution.
Looking into the IRO constitution, we see some formulations reappearing in the
1951 Convention. However, it had a more explicit focus on specific groups, mainly
the victims of  Nazi, fascist or collaborating regimes and persons who had been
considered refugees before World War II “for reasons of race, religion, nationality or
political opinion.” The IRO’s deputy executive secretary Arthur Rucker summed up
the organization’s mandate in 1948:
We were set up for a quite specific task … the IRO is concerned with the
non-Germanic refugees who were left at the end of 1945 in Germany, in
Austria, and in Italy, with certain groups of pre-war refugees, the Spanish
refugees, the so-called Nansen refugees, Russians, Armenians, etc., and
with groups of both Europeans and Chinese refugees in China.
Except for some ten thousand overseas Chinese, these were exclusively European
refugees. Rucker was aware that there were millions of more refugees in the world at
that time, conceding it was “not the task of the IRO to deal with more than a fraction
of that problem.” The IRO assistance for repatriation of the Chinese was partly
“a bargaining chip” that allowed the organization to continue assisting European
refugees in China. The IRO made substantial efforts to assist 29,000 Europeans
after the communist revolution in October 1949 and resettled nearly twenty thousand
of them. Some other refugee groups scattered around the globe did come under the
IRO mandate due to earlier arrangements, but again, all of them were of European
origin. We will come back to them later.
Apart from the exact legal definitions, Claudena Skran reminds us, concerning the
interwar refugee regime, that refugee legislation (like human rights more broadly)
is highly “aspirational.” It does not define legislation that states follow to the letter,
but it sets a standard, which national policies and legislation shall aspire to fulfill.
The aspirational character of refugee definitions thus shows us the ideal these
very definitions are referring to. While the circumscribed group definitions covered
only explicitly named groups, the general definition of the 1951 Convention had
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a temporal limit (“before 1 January 1951”) and partly a geographic limitation (“in
Europe or elsewhere”). It was a product of the World Wars experiences and the
massive displacement and de-nationalization in Europe. The aspirational ideal was
a (Western) world of nation-states open to (de jure or de facto) stateless European
refugees. Colonized subjects stood outside the citizen-refugee dichotomy.
However, if we look from a global perspective, we see that Europe was but one area
of massive population displacement at that time. Millions were displaced in China
(first from Japanese occupation, then Civil War) and South Asia (following India
and Pakistan’s partition). However, they did not come under the IRO or the 1951
Convention. Palestinian refugees came under a special agreement and institution
(UNRWA, est. 1949) and Koreans under another UN institution (UNKRA, 1950-58).
People fleeing within or from colonies in Africa were considered interior affairs to
be dealt with by the ruling imperial authorities. At the same time, there were some
internationally recognized “refugees” outside Europe: Poles in India, Russians in the
Philippines, and Poles and Greek in several African countries. The one aspect all
these diverse refugee groups had in common was their European origin.
The IRO, Polish refugees, and India’s refusal to ratify the Refugee Convention
The simultaneous inclusion of Europeans and exclusion of non-Europeans became
most glaringly apparent in South Asia. Until today, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh
are not part of the Geneva Convention leading to a precarious legal situation for
refugees in the region. While the UNHCR operates in India since the 1970s, its
government did never sign the Convention. While there are many reasons for
this, it might also have something to do with the postwar era and the IRO (and
subsequently UNHCR) refusal to take care of the partition refugees in 1947. At the
time of independence from Britain, millions of people had to flee following India and
Pakistan’s partition in June 1947. Nevertheless, the IRO was active in India at the
same time. Starting in July 1947, 4,250 Polish refugees in India received care and
maintenance from the IRO. The Poles had come to India in 1942 when the country
was still a colony, and British strategists had an interest in getting these Polish
civilians into safety and out of the way.
Both, South Asian and IRO officials were well aware of the discrepancy between the
two refugee groups. Maurice Lush, the IRO chief representative for the region, noted
that the Indian government took the line “either come here in force and deal with our
seven million Indian refugees or remove your few thousand Europeans.” The IRO
chose the latter and evacuated the Poles. When the British troops withdrew from
India in February 1948, the IRO had resettled most Poles elsewhere and shipped the
last seven hundred to Uganda. The newly independent South Asian states had to
cope with the partition refugees by themselves. Two years later, in December 1950,
disappointed by the developments leading up to the Refugee Convention, the Indian
UN delegate said: “The United Nations should try to help not only special sections of
the world’s population but all afflicted people everywhere. Suffering knew no racial or
political boundaries; it was the same for all.” The prevailing impression in South Asia
was that the UNHCR was, like its predecessor, an institution for Europeans.
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In East Africa, the Poles joined some fourteen thousand compatriots living in refugee
camps in the British colonies. They were the remains of nearly twenty thousand
Polish refugees who had been evacuated in 1942 to what is today Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and South Africa. Like the Poles remaining
in India, these refugees had been forcefully deported in 1940 from Eastern Poland
to the Soviet interior, released in 1941, and evacuated with thousands of Polish
soldiers to Iran. While the soldiers joined the British army in the fight against
Germany, the civilians were transferred to the British colonial empire. After the war,
most of them refused to return to Poland under Soviet domination, but the colonial
administrators wanted to get rid of them.
The British were eager to include the Poles under the IRO mandate (and its
predecessor organization UNRRA). The IRO took over the financial responsibility
and organized their resettlement. The organization succeeded in closing all Polish
refugee camps in Africa and finding “durable solutions” for the remaining refugees.
In the end, Britain accepted most, some were resettled to Australia, and some few
were allowed to stay with permanent residency in Africa. In 1951, these refugees
could have come – through the Convention’s first paragraph – under the Refugee
Convention’s mandate. In the same year, however, the last Polish refugee camps in
Tanganyika and Uganda were closed.
UNHCR’s “Good Office” Refugees and the “Myth of Difference”
When Rwandan refugees started arriving in these very same countries in 1959 –
just eight years after the Poles had left – the British colonial government’s response
was quite different. In contrast to the Poles, the British were not eager to get
the Rwandans under an international refugee mandate. In December 1961, the
Commonwealth Relations Office in London explained in a confidential telegram:
Present mandate of [UN] High Commissioner is limited broadly speaking
to operations in Europe which are still incomplete. To operate elsewhere
High Commissioner would require new mandate from General Assembly
and additional funds. There are many refugee problems in the world today
—Tibetans, Angolans, Cubans, etc. High Commissioner’s resources are
very limited and sufficient only for existing commitments.
According to British officials, the best way to assist refugees in Africa was through
UNHCR’s “good offices.” The High Commissioner would collect and channel funds
for refugee assistance but would not recognize them as “mandate” refugees. From
1957 onwards, the “good office” formula was a way for UNHCR to assist non-
European refugees without granting them fundamental rights or offending the
imperial powers involved. The UNHCR had established this formula in 1957 to assist
Chinese refugees in British Hong Kong and refugees from French Algeria. It was
essential for the global expansion of UNHCR activities until the 1967 Protocol was
signed. However, the distinction between European “mandate” refugees and non-
European “good office” refugees established a differentiation that lived on in what
Bhupinder Chimni has termed the “myth of difference.” By distinguishing European
from non-European refugees, policies of containing the latter were legitimized. As we
have seen here, this differentiation started before 1951. As Chimni and others have
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shown, it is still relevant in current refugee policies, even after the 1967 Protocol led
to a legal universalization of refugee rights.
 
This post is part of the series “70 Years of UNHCR and the 1951 Refugee
Convention: Global Developments”, which is edited and published in cooperation by
the Völkerrechtsblog and the Forced Migration Studies Blog (FluchtforschungsBlog). 
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